Introduction
On 10 March 2026, in Paris, leaders from approximately 40 countries gathered at the second global Nuclear Energy Summit, hosted by France in cooperation with the IAEA. The message was unambiguous: nuclear energy is no longer a political taboo. It is, once again, part of the solution.
“The phase-out of nuclear was a strategic mistake.” — Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, Paris, 10 March 2026
This declaration comes from someone who served as a cabinet minister under Angela Merkel — in the government that decided to phase out nuclear in Germany after Fukushima. A reversal of this magnitude is not trivial. It signals that something has fundamentally shifted in Europe’s energy calculus.
But what exactly has changed? And what does it mean for the future of renewable energy — particularly for solar projects serving municipalities and local communities?
These are questions without definitive answers yet. But we have data. And it deserves careful attention.
1. Why Is Nuclear Returning Now?
Energy Security Under Geopolitical Pressure
On 28 February 2026, the US and Israel struck Iran. The Strait of Hormuz — through which approximately 20% of global oil production and 20% of global LNG trade normally flows — was partially blocked. Brent crude rose 10–15% in the opening days, reaching $120/barrel at its peak.
European natural gas prices (TTF benchmark) jumped 60% relative to pre-conflict levels. On 2 March, QatarEnergy declared force majeure after Iranian drones struck the Ras Laffan facilities — the world’s largest liquefaction hub, responsible for approximately 20% of global LNG production.
~30% capacity — five-year low
European gas storage (Feb. 2026)
+50% in one day — largest since 2022
TTF gas price spike (2 March 2026)
€1.82 → €2.07/litre (+14%)
German petrol price increase (Feb–Mar 2026)
Europe has seen this before. In 2022, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine triggered the worst energy crisis since the 1973 oil shock. Now, less than four years later, another distant conflict is again threatening European energy security.
“The current conflict in Iran shows once again that the best way to secure a predictable and reliable energy horizon is to increase home-grown production. This is the only way to become autonomous, independent, and secure our energy system.” — Ursula von der Leyen, 19 March 2026
Rising Electricity Demand — AI and Data Centres
A second factor, less dramatic but structurally significant over the long term, is the explosion in energy demand generated by artificial intelligence and data centres.
~70 TWh
EU data centre consumption (2024)
~115–287 TWh
EU data centre consumption (2030 projection)
+12%/year over the past 5 years
Global data centre consumption growth
triple processing capacity in 5–7 years (Cloud & AI Development Act)
EU target
A single AI-focused data centre consumes as much electricity as 100,000 households. The largest planned facilities will consume 20 times more. Ireland is already at 21% of national electricity dedicated to data centres — projected to reach 32% by 2026.
The key question is this: can the European electricity grid absorb this massive additional demand? And through what energy mix?
2. What Was Decided in Paris?
€200 million
EU guarantee for SMRs (SMR Strategy, adopted 10 March 2026)
10+ member states
EU countries interested in SMRs through national plans
17–53 GW
Projected EU SMR capacity by 2050 (preliminary sector estimate)
12 member states, ~23.3% of electricity production
Active nuclear reactors in the EU (2024)
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz described Germany’s nuclear phase-out as “a major error” that led to high energy prices. Greece announced a ministerial committee for SMRs. The Czech Republic plans to double nuclear output and is building new reactors at Temelín with South Korea.
But there is a technical and financial reality that tempers the enthusiasm.
Flamanville 3 (France), the most recent reactor connected to the grid in the EU, came online in December 2024 — 12 years late and at costs four times the initial estimates. SMRs still exist largely on paper; the first commercial units are expected in the 2030s. Decommissioning costs for Europe’s nuclear fleet are underfunded by an estimated ~€118 billion.
3. What Remains of the Case for Solar?
Deployment Speed
A solar park can be built and grid-connected in 1–3 years. A large nuclear reactor takes 10–20 years from decision to first kilowatt-hour delivered. SMRs, even in the optimistic scenario, will not be commercially available before 2032–2035.
Marginal Cost and Scalability
Solar LCOE has fallen by more than 90% over the past 15 years. Solar requires no imported fuel, is not exposed to geopolitical shocks in the Persian Gulf, and generates no radioactive waste with thousand-year lifespans.
Relevance for Municipalities
AI data centres cluster in a handful of European hubs: Frankfurt, London, Amsterdam, Paris, and Dublin. Small and medium-sized municipalities — unless they eventually host SMRs, if that ever becomes reality — will see no direct benefit from new nuclear capacity.
Distributed solar, by contrast, can be installed locally, reduce community energy bills, generate municipal revenue, and contribute to local energy self-sufficiency — exactly the kind of objective pursued by a growing number of municipalities across Northern Europe and South Ostrobothnia.
4. The Questions That Remain Open
Will the EU manage to build SMRs at the promised costs and timelines, or will it repeat the Flamanville experience?
Is the Commission’s €200 million guarantee sufficient to mobilize private investment at the required scale?
Will the Iran conflict accelerate the energy transition, or will it provoke a temporary return to fossil fuels because of the immediate supply crisis?
Will massive AI data centre demand be met by renewables, nuclear, or gas — and who will decide?
Will small municipalities in regions like South Ostrobothnia have access to financing for local solar projects, or will resources be concentrated in large nuclear infrastructure?
How will European electricity markets balance if some states expand nuclear while others remain committed to 100% renewables?
Conclusion
Greenconexa does not have answers to these questions. But it watches them closely — because every renewable energy project we develop today will operate in an energy landscape shaped by the decisions being made right now.
Sources
IAEA — Nuclear Energy Summit 2026, Paris
https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/global-leaders-affirm-central-role-for-nuclear-at-2026-nuclear-energy-summit
European Commission — SMR Strategy & Nuclear Illustrative Programme (10 March 2026)
https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/nuclear-energy/nuclear-investment-needs_en
IEA — Energy and AI: Data Centre Electricity Demand
https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-and-ai/energy-demand-from-ai
IEA — Overcoming Energy Constraints for Europe’s Data Centres (Nov 2025)
https://www.iea.org/commentaries/overcoming-energy-constraints-is-key-to-delivering-on-europe-s-data-centre-goals
Bruegel — How Will the Iran Conflict Hit European Energy Markets? (Mar 2026)
https://www.bruegel.org/first-glance/how-will-iran-conflict-hit-european-energy-markets
Atlantic Council — How the Iran War Could Trigger a European Energy Crisis (Mar 2026)
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/how-the-iran-war-could-trigger-a-european-energy-crisis/
Goldman Sachs — How Will the Iran Conflict Impact Oil Prices?
https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/articles/how-will-the-iran-conflict-impact-oil-prices